



# Trusted Domain Support

as Active Directory Domain Controller

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<https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2018/SambaXP/>

# Talks at SambaXP/SDC 2017

- ▶ Last year I gave talks about concepts and details of trusted domains
- ▶ "The Important Details Of Windows Authentication" at SambaXP.
- ▶ <https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SambaXP/>
- ▶ "Windows Authentication With Multiple Domains and Forests" at Storage Developer Conference.
- ▶ <https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2017/SDC/>

# Topics

- ▶ The long road to trust support (4.3.0, 4.7.0, 4.8.0, master)
- ▶ samba-tool domain trust commands
- ▶ wbinfo -m -verbose changes
- ▶ Automatic creation of foreignSecurityPrincipal objects
- ▶ Implementing SID expanding/filtering
- ▶ Forest/Domain-wide Authentication
- ▶ Selective Authentication (Cross Organization Trusts)
- ▶ Future Improvements/Open Bugs
- ▶ Questions?

# The long road to trust support (Part1, before 4.3.0)

- ▶ It started with a Red Hat project to support Forest Trusts to FreeIPA:
  - ▶ Red Hat sponsored my work (via SerNet)
  - ▶ The initial target was only Kerberos
  - ▶ NTLMSSP was not required and got deferred
- ▶ Preparation work:
  - ▶ The Windows GUI should be able to create/manage trusts
  - ▶ It was required to fix/implement several LSA and Netlogon RPC calls
  - ▶ The most challenging was the forest information conflict detection
- ▶ Our own tools:
  - ▶ 'samba-tool domain trust \*' commands were added
  - ▶ They use very similar network requests as the Windows GUI
  - ▶ They manage trusts for the local domain by default
  - ▶ But they can also run against remote servers

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# Management: samba-tool domain trust

```
dc1:~$ samba-tool domain trust help
Usage: samba-tool domain trust <subcommand>

Domain and forest trust management.

Options:
  -h, --help  show this help message and exit

Available subcommands:
  create      - Create a domain or forest trust.
  delete     - Delete a domain trust.
  list       - List domain trusts.
  namespaces - Manage forest trust namespaces.
  show       - Show trusted domain details.
  validate   - Validate a domain trust.

For more help on a specific subcommand,
please type: samba-tool domain trust <subcommand> (-h|--help)
```

# The long road to trust support (Part2, before 4.3.0)

- ▶ We added code to manage and use a trust routing table:
  - ▶ Utility (dsdb\_trust\_\*) functions made it easier for high level code
  - ▶ They load the forest information of the local forest
  - ▶ They load the forest information of all trusted domain/forests
  - ▶ Some put everything together to form a routing table
- ▶ Implementing INCOMING and OUTGOING trust support for Kerberos:
  - ▶ The KDC was changed to use the routing table
  - ▶ AS-Requests may refer clients to the correct KDC with WRONG\_REALM referrals
  - ▶ TGS-Requests may result in cross realm referral tickets
- ▶ Regression selftests:
  - ▶ We established trust relationships between several environments
  - ▶ It was relatively easy by using the new 'samba-tool domain trust' commands
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  - ▶ NTLMSSP and LSA LookupNames Sids were not implemented for outgoing trusts
- ▶ There were also security limitations:
  - ▶ No SID filtering rules are applied at all!
  - ▶ Both sides of the trust need to fully trust each other!
  - ▶ This means DCs of domain A can grant domain admin rights in domain B!
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  - ▶ But it was still only be usable for some rare usecases
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  - ▶ SerNet got more and more customers asking for trust support
  - ▶ This was often the only reason they had to keep using Windows servers
- ▶ Other customers had a lot of problems with trusts on member servers
  - ▶ We knew that support for trusted domains on a member server faces very similar problems than on a domain controller
- ▶ By selling the SAMBA+ subscriptions
  - ▶ We had the opportunity to think about sponsoring our own projects
  - ▶ So we decided to bring trust support for DCs to a level which is really useful for customers
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# The long road to trust support (Part4, 4.7.0 and more)

- ▶ The new "map untrusted to domain = auto" option
  - ▶ Was introduced to improve member server setups
  - ▶ It lets the domain controllers of the primary domain do its job
  - ▶ The member server doesn't have to know about trusted domains
  - ▶ There is just an outgoing transitive trust to the primary domain
- ▶ The "map untrusted to domain" and "auth methods" options
  - ▶ Got deprecated in 4.7.0 and removed in 4.8.0
  - ▶ The (new) default behaviour (as of 4.7.0) was kept for 4.8.0
- ▶ The "winbind scan trusted domains" option
  - ▶ With "map untrusted to domain" being removed there is no need to have a list of trusted domain available in winbindd
  - ▶ We no longer try to list all trusted domain recursively
  - ▶ The option was added in 4.8.0, but the default is still "yes"
  - ▶ But the old (default) is only required for domain specific idmap backend configurations
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- ▶ The most challenging task was a rewrite of gensec processing
  - ▶ Async authentication is required for to trusted domains
  - ▶ The complexity of spnego.c relied on recursing into the sync 'gensec\_update()' implementation
- ▶ It took a while to create a patchset for upstream inclusion:
  - ▶ In total 31 files changed, 3774 insertions(+), 1954 deletions(-)
  - ▶ It took about 150 (relatively small) commits to make auth/gensec fully async
  - ▶ 82 patches just for spnego.c
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- ▶ Trusted domain support requires winbindd in 4.8.0
  - ▶ On domain members the primary domain is also a trusted domain
  - ▶ The AD DC already required and used winbindd internally
- ▶ winbindd loads the full domain topology as AD DC
  - ▶ We also load all domains of forest trusts
  - ▶ Internally we remember a "routing domain" for transitive trusts
  - ▶ Only uses NETLOGON and LSA with Netlogon Secure Channel
  - ▶ Only anonymous DCERPC transports (tcp or unauthenticated smb)
  - ▶ No NTLMSSP, no Kerberos!
  - ▶ No SAMR, no LDAP!
- ▶ LookupNames and LookupSids are routed via winbindd as AD DC
  - ▶ There are various scopes for LookupNames/Sids
  - ▶ Predefined, Builtin, Account Domain, Trusts
  - ▶ We use abstracted view tables for this
  - ▶ At the end winbindd is the last resort routing
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## Admin visible changes in 4.8.0 (Part1)

- ▶ Previously "wbinfo -m -verbose" produced confusing results
  - ▶ It mixed the views recursively of all reachable domains
  - ▶ The trust types and directions don't match the view of the local system
- ▶ This changed to be more useful in 4.8.0
  - ▶ The trust properties printed have been changed to correctly reflect the view of the system where wbinfo is executed (only!)
  - ▶ This is only correct with "winbind scan trusted domains" effectively "no"
  - ▶ On a domain member trusted domains are learned on the fly if used

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# Admin visible changes in 4.8.0 (Part2)

- ▶ Example, on a AD DC (SDOM1):

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dc1:~$ wbinfo -m --verbose
Domain Name DNS Domain      Trust Type  Transitive  In   Out
BUILTIN                    Local
SDOM1      sdom1.site  RWDC
WDOM3      wdom3.site  Forest      Yes      No   Yes
WDOM2      wdom2.site  Forest      Yes      Yes  Yes
SUBDOM31   subdom31.wdom3.site Routed (via WDOM3)
SUBDOM21   subdom21.wdom2.site Routed (via WDOM2)
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## Admin visible changes in 4.8.0 (Part3)

- ▶ Same setup, on a member of WDOM2:

```
member1:~$ wbinfo -m --verbose
Domain Name DNS Domain      Trust Type  Transitive  In   Out
BUILTIN                               Local
TITAN                                 Local
WDOM2      wdom2.site    Workstation Yes      No   Yes
WDOM1      wdom1.site    Routed (via WDOM2)
WDOM3      wdom3.site    Routed (via WDOM2)
SUBDOM21   subdom21.wdom2.site Routed (via WDOM2)
SDOM1      sdom1.site    Routed (via WDOM2)
SUBDOM11   subdom11.wdom1.site Routed (via WDOM2)
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- ▶ The list of trusts may be incomplete
- ▶ Additional domains may appear as "Routed" if a user of an unknown domain is successfully authenticated

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# foreignSecurityPrincipal objects (Part 1)

- ▶ Domain local (resource) groups
  - ▶ Should be able to have users/group of trusted domains as members
  - ▶ We only support one domain in our forest (yet)
  - ▶ So we have to care about just about foreignSecurityPrincipal objects (FPO)
- ▶ The "member" attribute
  - ▶ Requires a full extended dn of an object in the local forest
  - ▶ Is an FPO-enabled attribute (as well as msDS-MembersForAzRole, msDS-NeverRevealGroup and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup)
  - ▶ It automatically creates an FPO if a foreign extended dn SID is added
  - ▶ E.g. '<SID=S-1-5-21-123-456-789-512>' or '<SID=S-1-5-11>' does not belong to any domain in the local forest
  - ▶ CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=example,DC=com
- ▶ samba-tool group addmembers
  - ▶ Allows members to be specified as SID-string
  - ▶ E.g. 'S-1-5-21-123-456-789-512'
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# foreignSecurityPrincipal objects (Part 2)

## Get some details of the trust

```
dc1:~$ samba-tool domain trust list
Type[Forest]    Transitive[Yes] Direction[BOTH]    Name[addom.samba.example.com]
```

```
dc1:$ samba-tool domain trust show addom.samba.example.com
LocalDomain Netbios[SAMBA2008R2] DNS[samba2008r2.example.com] SID[S-1-5-21-123-456-789]
TrustedDomain:

NetbiosName:    ADDDOMAIN
DnsName:        addom.samba.example.com
SID:            S-1-5-21-987-654-321
Type:           0x2 (UPLEVEL)
Direction:      0x3 (BOTH)
Attributes:     0x8 (FOREST_TRANSITIVE)
PosixOffset:    0x00000000 (0)
kerb_EncTypes: 0x18 (AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96)
Namespaces[4]  TDO[addom.samba.example.com]:
TLN: Status[Enabled] DNS[*.*.ADDOM.SAMBA.EXAMPLE.COM.upn]
TLN: Status[Enabled] DNS[*.*.ADDOM.SAMBA.EXAMPLE.COM.spn]
TLN: Status[Enabled] DNS[*.*.addom.samba.example.com]
DOM: Status[Enabled] DNS[addom.samba.example.com] Netbios[ADDOMAIN]
                SID[S-1-5-21-987-654-321]
```

# foreignSecurityPrincipal objects (Part 2)

## Get some details of the trust

```
dc1:~$ samba-tool domain trust list
Type[Forest]    Transitive[Yes] Direction[BOTH]    Name[addom.samba.example.com]
```

```
dc1:$ samba-tool domain trust show addom.samba.example.com
LocalDomain Netbios[SAMBA2008R2] DNS[samba2008r2.example.com] SID[S-1-5-21-123-456-789]
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```

## foreignSecurityPrincipal objects (Part 3)

How to add 'ADDOMAIN\Domain Admins' to 'SAMBA2008R2\Domain Admins'

```
dc1:$ wbinfos --name-to-sid 'ADDOMAIN\Domain Admins'  
S-1-5-21-987-654-321-512 SID_DOM_GROUP (2)
```

```
dc1:$ samba-tool group listmembers 'Domain Admins'  
Administrator
```

```
dc1:$ samba-tool group addmembers 'Domain Admins' S-1-5-21-987-654-321-512  
Added members to group Domain Admins
```

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# SID-Expanding (Part1)

- ▶ Domain local (resource) groups
  - ▶ Need to be expanded before using the received authorization token
  - ▶ Before expanding the BUILTIN groups for local authentication
  - ▶ Before returning `netr_LogonSamLogon[{WithFlags,Ex}]()`
  - ▶ Before returning CROSS-REALM Kerberos Tickets
  
- ▶ We have this in `authsam_update_user_info_dc()`
  - ▶ Called from `source4/auth/ntlm/auth_winbind.c`
  - ▶ Called from `source4/kdc/pac-glue.c`
  - ▶ In master, will be in 4.9.0
  
- ▶ Some TODOs...
  - ▶ We don't add `SE_GROUP_RESOURCE` yes
  - ▶ We don't use resource group compression for Kerberos
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## SID-Expanding (Part2)

The fully expanded token of a authentication of a user from a trusted domain

```
dc1:$ ldbsearch -H ldap://dc1.samba2008r2.example.com -UADDDOMAIN\Administrator" -b "" -s
      base tokenGroups
# record 1
dn:
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-987-654-321-500
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-987-654-321-513
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-987-654-321-512
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-987-654-321-572
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-987-654-321-518
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-987-654-321-519
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-987-654-321-520
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-123-456-789-1109
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-123-456-789-512
tokenGroups: S-1-5-21-123-456-789-572
tokenGroups: S-1-1-0
tokenGroups: S-1-5-2
tokenGroups: S-1-5-11
tokenGroups: S-1-5-64-10
tokenGroups: S-1-5-32-544
tokenGroups: S-1-5-32-545
tokenGroups: S-1-5-32-554
```

Resource / domain local groups (type 4) should not be passed, needs to be fixed!

```
dc1:$ wbinfo --sid-to-name S-1-5-21-987-654-321-572
ADDDOMAIN\Denied RODC Password Replication Group 4
```

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# SID-Filtering (Part 1)

- ▶ A trusted domain could spoof an authorization token
  - ▶ Local admin privileges could be gained
  - ▶ Very critical in case of cross organization trusts
  - ▶ See [MS-PAC] 4.1.2 Authorization Validation and Filtering
- ▶ Based on the documentation (and some further thinking)
  - ▶ I added `dom_sid_filter_token_sid()` and `dom_sid_filter_{domain,upn}_name()`
  - ▶ They operate on just one sid or name
  - ▶ They take the local domain/forest information
  - ▶ They take the used secure channel type
  - ▶ They take the remote domain/forest information
- ▶ `authsam_update_user_info_dc()` also filters
  - ▶ We filter SIDs as well as names using the helper functions
  - ▶ Used in `source4/kdc/pac-glue.c`
  - ▶ `source4/auth/ntlm/auth_winbind.c` can't filter, uses `SEC_CHAN_BDC`
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## SID-Filtering (Part 2)

- ▶ Filtering in winbindd...
  - ▶ netr\_LogonSamLogon[{{WithFlags,Ex}}]() results are filtered
  - ▶ lsa\_Lookup{{Sids,Names}}() results are filtered
  - ▶ pdb\_filter\_hints() and pdb\_update\_validation() are added
  - ▶ pdb\_samba\_dsdb implements this for the AD DC
  - ▶ All non AD DC roles still get local SAM, BUILTIN protection
  
- ▶ Work in progress...
  - ▶ [git://git.samba.org/metze/samba/wip.git](https://git.samba.org/metze/samba/wip.git)
  - ▶ master3-trusts-ok
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# Forest/Domain-wide Authentication

- ▶ Forest/Domain-wide Authentication (the default) allows:
  - ▶ Authentication of each principal of the trusted forest/domain
  - ▶ Authentication to each service in the trusting forest/domain
- ▶ Authorization is handled by:
  - ▶ Using ACLs on individual resources (objects, files, ...)
  - ▶ Access might be granted just by "Authenticated Users" ACEs
- ▶ One-way trusts:
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  - ▶ Make the use of S4U2Self impossible

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# Selective Authentication (Cross Organization Trusts) (Part1)

- ▶ Trusts can be marked for selective authentication:
  - ▶ Using LSA\_TRUST\_ATTRIBUTE\_CROSS\_ORGANIZATION
  - ▶ The trusting end adds the OTHER\_ORGANIZATION SID (S-1-5-1000) to any token
  - ▶ By default authentication of trusted principals to trusting services is rejected with STATUS\_AUTHENTICATION\_FIREWALL\_FAILED
- ▶ Selective authentication checking:
  - ▶ Only done if the token contains S-1-5-1000
  - ▶ The "AllowedToAuthenticateTo" extended access right is required on the AD object of the service
- ▶ Advantages of selective authentication:
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- ▶ `authsam_update_user_info_dc()` also "selects"
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# Future Improvements / Open Bugs

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  - ▶ Bug 11517: Samba 4.3 GPO issue when Trust is enabled
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# Questions?

- ▶ Stefan Metzmacher, [metze@samba.org](mailto:metze@samba.org)
- ▶ <https://www.sernet.com>