

Improving DCERPC Security

https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DCERPC_Hardening

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Samba Team / SerNet

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https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2016/SDC/



- The badlock related bugs
- Scope of the urgent changes
- What is DCERPC?
- Existing Hardening
- Remaining Problems
- Proposed Solutions
- Summary/Status
- Questions?

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- ▶ I gave a talk about Badlock and the related bugs at SambaXP 2016
 - https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2016/SambaXP/
 - https://sambaxp.org
 - http://badlock.org
- I just give a short overview here...



- The first denial of service problem was found at an interop event by Jouni Knuutinen from Synopsys
- Jeremy Allison did the initial research
- While reviewing the initial patches the nightmare begun
- I found new problems day after day

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- About 20 problem classes (mostly denial of service and man in the middle)
- Distributed over 4 DCERPC implementations (2 servers, 2 clients)
- I analysed these problems deeply together with Günther Deschner
- At the end I had 94 patches including an almost complete DCERPC protocol verification testsuite

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CVE-2016-2118: Badlock (Part 1)

- While thinking about the CVE-2015-5370 patches I thought about possible related problems
- After a while I found that the DCERPC auth_level can be downgraded and nasty things can be done with it
- ► My first finding was limited to clients using ncacn_ip_tcp with SAMR
- I created a man in the middle exploit that got the full AD database including all secret keys while joining a Windows DC into a Windows domain
- NOTE THIS IS A FULL TAKEOVER: information leak and remote code execution on all domain member computers (maybe also in trusted domains)
- The attacker only needs to be able to intercept network traffic
- I guess it's really not that unlikely that someone might find exploits for an unpatched router firmware



- After thinking a bit more I finally realized that the problem is even worse
- It is not limited to a join of a new Windows DC
- Every login as an administrator can be used by an attacker
- It is not limited to just Windows domains, also Samba domains are affected
- The problem is a generic to DCERPC over unprotected transports like ncacn_ip_tcp or ncacn_np (without SMB signing)
- Some application layer protocols (e.g. DRSUAPI) only allow secure connections using integrity or privacy protection
- Samba was missing most of these checks which were already available on Windows

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CVE-2016-2110: NTLMSSP problems

- While working on CVE-2015-5370 and CVE-2016-2118 I thought a complete audit of all protocols was required
- After a while I found that NTLMSSP flags, e.g. NTLMSSP_SIGN/SEAL can be removed by a man in the middle without noticing
- This has implications on encrypted LDAP traffic
- A bit of research revealed that Microsoft already implemented downgrade detection into NTLMSSP when using NTLMv2
- I decided to implement the same in Samba in order to improve NTLMSSP authenticated connections



- While researching about CVE-2016-2110 I found Microsofts CVE-2015-0005 "NETLOGON Spoofing Vulnerability"
- The problem with this was that any domain member was able to ask the domain controller for NTLM session keys of authentication sessions of all other domain members.
- The protection mechanism relies on NTLMv2 being used only via NTLMSSP
- During the research it turned out that the problems in Samba were even worse
- Anonymous attackers could ask for the session keys
- raw NTLMv2 was allowed without NTLMSSP wrapping, which allowed downgrade attacks

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CVE-2016-2112: LDAP problems

- Fixing the specific NTLMSSP based problems of CVE-2016-2110 is not enough
- The LDAP client and server also need to verify if the authentication (gensec/gssapi) backend negotiated the requested features
- This is required in order to prevent Kerberos replay attacks
- It was required to fix these things in the LDAP server as well as in our two LDAP client libraries
- At the same time we improved the consistency of behaviors especially regarding the usage of configuration options
- The default behavior of the LDAP server is much stricter than before



- While analyzing CVE-2016-2110 and CVE-2016-2112, I realized that we don't do any certificate validation
- This applies to all TLS based protocols like ldaps:// and ncacn_http with https://
- For Idaps:// it only applies to tools like samba-tool, Idbsearch, Idbedit and other Idb tools
- Typically, these protocols are not used, but if someone does use them they are expected to be protected
- So (as a client) we now verify the server certificates as much as we can

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CVE-2016-2114: "server signing = mandatory" not enforced

- While working on CVE-2015-5370 and CVE-2016-2118 I thought a complete audit of all protocols was required
- As all unprotected DCERPC transports are vulnerable to man in the middle attacks it was clear that SMB signing is important
- It turned out that we didn't require SMB signing even if we are configured with mandatory signing
- This is fixed now

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 As an active directory domain controller we require signing by default now



- While working on CVE-2015-5370 and CVE-2016-2118 I thought a complete audit of all protocols was required
- As all unprotected DCERPC transports are vulnerable to man in the middle attacks it was clear that SMB signing is important
- We can't change the default of "client signing" and "client max protocol" in a security release, because of performance reasons
- We try to use SMB3 and required signing for IPC\$ related SMB client connections, which are used as a DCERPC transport

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Scope of the urgent changes

- In order to prevent the man in the middle attacks it was required to change the (default) behavior for some protocols.
- ▶ As the Samba Team we only have resources to provide security fixes for 3 maintained branches (at the time 4.4, 4.3 and 4.2)
 - 4.4.2 had 323 patches on top of 4.4.0 (note that 4.4.1 had a regression and was superseeded by 4.4.2)
 - samba-4.4.0-security-2016-04-12-final.patch
 227 files changed, 14582 insertions(+), 5037 deletions(-)
 - 4.3.8 had 352 patches on top of 4.3.6 (note that 4.3.7 had a regression and was superseeded by 4.3.8)
 - samba-4.3.6-security-2016-04-12-final.patch
 236 files changed, 14870 insertions(+), 5195 deletions(-)
 - 4.2.11 had 440 patches on top of 4.2.9 (note that 4.2.10 had a regression and was superseeded by 4.2.11)
 - samba-4.2.9-security-2016-04-12-final.patch
 319 files changed, 17636 insertions(+), 7506 deletions(-)


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- Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Calls
 - It is an infrastructure to call a function on a remote server
 - "remote" is connected via some kind of socket (tcp/ip, named pipes, ...)
- As development environment
 - Function stubs are typically autogenerated from an Interface Definition Language (IDL)
- As network protocol defines how:
 - marshalling of payloads work transfer syntax (NDR/NDR64)
 - marshalling of PDUs
 - PDUs are ordered

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- authentication and encryption works
- My talk from 2014 has much more details
 - https://samba.org/~metze/presentations/2014/

Wireshark DCERPC (BIND)



SDC SAMBA Stefan Metzmacher Improving DCERPC Security SerNet Existing DCERPC Hardening (PFC_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN)

GSS-API based authentication is used

- NTLMSSP, KRB5, SPNEGO
- A custom security provider for the NETLOGON service
- gss_wrap_iov() is required to support header signing

MS-RPCE 2.2.2.3 PFC_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN Flag.

- Same value as PFC_PENDING_CANCEL
- This flag can be negotiated in the Bind/BindAck exchange
- On Windows and modern Samba installations all security providers support it.
- It protects the header fields of DCERPC Request/Response PDUs incl. the sec_trailer.

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Wireshark DCERPC PFC_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN

```
Version: 5
  Version (minor): 0
  Packet type: Bind (11)
▼ Packet Flags: 0x07
    0.... = Object: Not set
    .0.. .... = Maybe: Not set
    ..0. .... = Did Not Execute: Not set
     ...0 .... = Multiplex: Not set
     .... 0... = Reserved: Not set
    .... .1.. = Cancel Pending: Set PFC SUPPORT HEADER SIGN
    .... ..1. = Last Frag: Set
    .... ...1 = First Frag: Set
▶ Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, Float: IEEE)
  Frag Length: 198
  Auth Length: 74
  Call ID: 1
  Max Xmit Frag: 5840
  Max Recv Frag: 5840
  Assoc Group: 0x00000c58
  Num Ctx Items: 2
▶ Ctx Item[1]: Context ID:0, LSARPC, 32bit NDR
▶ Ctx Item[2]: Context ID:1, LSARPC, Bind Time Feature Negotiation
```



- MS-RPCE 2.2.2.13 Verification Trailer
 - A hidden structure injected at the end of the DCERPC Request stub data
 - Identified by a 8 byte magic value (0x8a, 0xe3, 0x13, 0x71, 0x02, 0xf4, 0x36, 0x71)

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- It contains an array of optional command structures
- rpc_sec_vt_bitmask protects the PFC_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN negotiation
- rpc_sec_vt_header2 protects the header fields if PFC_SUPPORT_HEADER_SIGN is not available
- rpc_sec_vt_pcontext protects the negotiation of the presentation context (InterfaceId/TransferSyntax)

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▼ Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Request, Fragment:
Version: 5
Version (minor): 0
Packet type: Request (0)
▶ Packet Flags: 0x03
Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, Float: IEEE)
Frag Length: 240
Auth Length: 16
Call ID: 2
Alloc hint: 188
Context ID: 0
Opnum: 6
[Response in frame: 66]
▼ Complete stub data (188 bytes)
Payload stub data (44 bytes)
▶ Verification Trailer
Auth Info: SPNEGO, Packet integrity, AuthContextId(1)
Local Security Authority, lsa_OpenPolicy



▼ Complete stub data (104 bytes) Payload stub data (44 bytes) ▼ Verification Trailer SEC VT SIGNATURE: 8ae3137102f43671 ▼ Command: BITMASK 1 ▶ Command: 0x0001, Cmd: BITMASK 1 Length: 4 ▶ rpc sec vt bitmask: 0x00000001, CLIENT SUPPORT HEADER SIGNING ▼ Command: PCONTEXT, END ▶ Command: 0x4002, Cmd: PCONTEXT, SEC VT COMMAND END Length: 40 ▼ pcontext Abstract Syntax: LSARPC Version: 0x00000000 Transfer Syntax: 32bit NDR Version: 0x00000002

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- MS-RPCE 2.2.2.14 BindTimeFeatureNegotiationBitmask
 - A way to negotiate new features
- Current defined features:
 - SecurityContextMultiplexingSupported
 - KeepConnectionOnOrphanSupported



- Ctx Item[1]: Context ID:0, LSARPC, 32bit NDR
- ▼ Ctx Item[2]: Context ID:1, LSARPC, Bind Time Feature Negotiation Context ID: 1
 - Num Trans Items: 1
 - ► Abstract Syntax: LSARPC V0.0
 - ▼ Transfer Syntax[1]: Bind Time Feature Negotiation V1
 - Transfer Syntax: Bind Time Feature Negotiation UUID:6cb71c2c-9812-4540-8300-00000000000
 - Bind Time Features: 0x0003, Security Context Multiplexing Supported, Keep Connection On Orphan Supported ver: 1

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- ▼ Ctx Item[1]: Acceptance, 32bit NDR Ack result: Acceptance (0) Transfer Syntax: 32bit NDR Syntax ver: 2
- Ctx Item[2]: Negotiate ACK, NULL Ack result: Negotiate ACK (3)
 - Bind Time Features: 0x0003, Security Context Multiplexing Supported, Keep Connection On Orphan Supported Transfer Syntax: MULL Syntax ver: 0



- DCERPC Fault, Cancel and Orphan PDUs don't include any integrity nor privacy protection.
- DCERPC_NCA_S_OP_RNG_ERROR is typically used to indicate that a specific opnum is not implemented by the server
- DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG is typically used to indicate that a specific information level is not supported
- There are higher level protection against downgrades required.
- The most important protocols don't have known downgrade problems.
- But it would be good to have real protection at the DCERPC layer.

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- SMB 3.x has support for generic encryption and downgrade detection
 - It wrapps SMB 2/3 PDUs inside an SMB2 TRANSFORM_HEADER PDU.
 - FSCTL_VALIDATE_NEGOTIATE_INFO was a nice try, but does not protect everything.
- ► SMB 3.1.1 has finally a working downgrade protection
 - A SHA512 preauth hash is calculated over the Negotiate and SessionSetup PDUs.
- BindTimeFeatureNegotiation and Verification Trailer should be able to build a backward compatible solution for DCERPC.
 - DCERPC_BIND_TIME_SUPPORT_PREAUTH
 - DCERPC_BIND_TIME_PROTECT_ALL_PDUS
 - DCERPC_BIND_TIME_SUPPORT_WRAP

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- DCERPC_BIND_TIME_SUPPORT_PREAUTH is negotiated in the Bind/BindAck exchange.
 - The DCERPC_BIND_ACK_RESULT_NEGOTIATE_ACK element is filled with a random transfer_syntax value as salt (16 bytes).
- All DCERPC Bind, BindAck, AlterContext, AlterContextResp and Auth3 PDUs update a rolling preauth hash.
 - These are triggered by the client and are strictly ordered.
 - Client and Server start with a zero preauth hash.
 - The preauth hash is updated when sending or receiving an unprotected PDU.
 - PREAUTH_SHA512 = SHA512(PREAUTH_SHA512, PDU).
- DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_PREAUTH is added to the verification trailer of the first request.
 - DCERPC_SEC_VT_COMMAND_PREAUTH contains a 16 byte SALT.
 - It also contains the result of SHA512(PREAUTH_SHA512 + SALT).

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Wireshark DCERPC Bind Time Features (PREAUTH Bind)



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Wireshark DCERPC Verification Trailer (PREAUTH

- Complete stub data (188 bytes)
 Payload stub data (44 bytes)
 - Verification Trailer SEC_VT_SIGNATURE: 8ae3137102f43671
 - Command: BITMASK_1
 - Command: PCONTEXT
 - Command: PREAUTH, END
 - Command: 0x4004, Cmd: PREAUTH, SEC_VT_COMMAND_END Length: 80
 - ▼ preauth
 - Salt: 5cf16b4a22602a6c10fd7678de2c235f
 - SHA512 Hash: 96a9bd8be3572ade794b5cad6e4371dc23d87296f1f5c2c9...



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Wireshark DCERPC Bind Time Features (PROTECT_ALL_PDUs Ack)

Num results: 2 ▼ Ctx Item[1]: Acceptance, 32bit NDR Ack result: Acceptance (0) Transfer Syntax: 32bit NDR Syntax ver: 2 Ctx Item[2]: Negotiate ACK, d38da7fa-a8a8-4ee8-9069-f840f6752401 Ack result: Negotiate ACK (3) ▼ Bind Time Features: 0x000c, Support SHA512 PREAUTH Verification, Support protection of all PDUs Security Context Multiplexing Supported: False1.. = Support SHA512 PREAUTH Verification: True 1... = Support protection of all PDUs: True Transfer Syntax: d38da7fa-a8a8-4ee8-9069-f840f6752401 Syntax ver: 0 Auth Info: SPNEGO, Packet integrity, AuthContextId(1)






▼ D:	istributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Fault, Fragment:
	Version: 5
	Version (minor): 0
	Packet type: Fault (3)
►	Packet Flags: 0x03
•	Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, Float: IEEE)
	Frag Length: 32
	Auth Length: 0
	Call ID: 2
	Alloc hint: 32
	Context ID: 0
	Cancel count: 0
•	Fault flags: 0x00
•	Status: nca_s_fault_access_denied (0x00000005)
	Reserved: 00000000
	[Opnum: 6]
	[Request in frame: 65]
	[Time from request: 0.000296000 seconds]
	Fault stub data (0 bytes)

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Wireshark DCERPC Fault PDU (Protected)

Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Fault, Fragmer
Version: 5
Version (minor): 0
Packet type: Fault (3)
Packet Flags: 0x03
Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, Float: IEEE)
Frag Length: 68
Auth Length: 28
Call ID: 2
Alloc hint: 24
Context ID: 0
Cancel count: 0
▶ Fault flags: 0x00
<pre>> Status: nca_s_fault_access_denied (0x00000005)</pre>
Reserved: 0000000
[Opnum: 45]
[Request in frame: 55]
[Time from request: 0.002011000 seconds]
Fault stub data (0 bytes)
Auth Info: SPNEGO, Packet integrity, AuthContextId(1)



The ncacn pdu IDL description in Samba:

```
typedef [public] struct {
   uint8 rpc_vers;
                                /* RPC version */
   uint8 rpc_vers_minor;
                               /* Minor version */
   dcerpc_pkt_type ptype;
                               /* Packet type */
   dcerpc_pfc_flags pfc_flags; /* Fragmentation flags */
   uint8 drep[4];
                                /* NDR data representation */
   uint16 frag_length;
                                /* Total length of fragment */
   uint16 auth_length;
                                /* authenticator length */
                                /* Call identifier */
    uint32 call id:
    [switch_is(ptype)] dcerpc_payload u;
} ncacn_packet;
```

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IDL definiation of the Payload union

The ncacn payload destription union:

typedef [nodiscriminant] union {		
[case(DCERPC_PKT_REQUEST)]	dcerpc_request	request;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_RESPONSE)]	dcerpc_response	response;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_FAULT)]	dcerpc_fault	fault;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_BIND)]	dcerpc_bind	bind;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_BIND_ACK)]	dcerpc_bind_ack	bind_ack;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_BIND_NAK)]	dcerpc_bind_nak	bind_nak
[case(DCERPC_PKT_ALTER)]	dcerpc_bind	alter
[case(DCERPC_PKT_ALTER_RESP)]	dcerpc_bind_ack	alter_resp;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_SHUTDOWN)]	dcerpc_shutdown	shutdown
[case(DCERPC_PKT_CO_CANCEL)]	dcerpc_co_cancel	co_cancel;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_ORPHANED)]	dcerpc_orphaned	orphaned;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_AUTH3)]	dcerpc_auth3	auth3;
[case(DCERPC_PKT_RTS)]	dcerpc_rts	rts;
/* WRAP packets used to improv	ve privacy */	
[case(DCERPC_PKT_WRAP)]	dcerpc_wrap	wrap;
<pre>} dcerpc_payload;</pre>		-



The IDL function definition (in Samba):

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typedef [public] struct {
//TODO/DISCUSS:
// - add random confounder at the beginning
// - add explicit verification traller
// - allow extra preauth hash check PDU
// - callid random?
// - flags?
// - How to detect downgrades on the client
<pre>// without breaking against old servers</pre>
/* this contains the real ncacn_packet blob and the auth verifier */
[flag(NDR_REMAINING)] DATA_BLOB pdu_and_verifier;
<pre>} dcerpc_wrap;</pre>

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Defining the Numbers..

- The specific numbers for flags and types need to agreed on
 - It would be good if Microsoft could assign them in MS-RPCE
 - Are other vendors also interested to implement (at least parts of) this?
- Bind Time Features:
 - DCERPC BIND TIME SUPPORT PREAUTH = 0x0004
 - DCERPC BIND TIME PROTECT ALL PDUS = 0x0008
 - DCERPC_BIND_TIME_SUPPORT_WRAP = 0x0010
- Verification Trailer Command:
 - DCERPC SEC VT COMMAND PREAUTH = 0x0004
- PDU Type:
 - DCERPC PKT WRAP = 21



- Low-level protocol testing
 - python/samba/tests/dcerpc/raw_protocol.py
 - This uses our python bindings to marshall PDUs and use raw sockets
 - This becomes a full DCERPC testsuite exploring almost each bit in the protocol

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- Windows 2012R2 is the current reference implementation
- Samba as AD DC also passes
- Currently 75 tests in master and 50 more waiting for review

Calling the raw protocol testsuite (in a Samba source tree):

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```
$ export SMB_CONF_PATH=/dev/null
$ export SERVER=w2012r2-188.w2012r2-16.base
$ export USERNAME=administrator
$ export PASSWORD=A1b2C3d4
```

```
$ python/samba/tests/dcerpc/raw_protocol.py -v -f TestDCERPC_BIND
```

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Application level problems (LSA and SAMR)

- Some LSA and SAMR functions use an SMB application session key
 - This implies that they only work on ncacn_np
 - They can't use DCERPC level authentication (integrity/privacy)
 - They rely on SMB signing/encryption
- There're used to be a wellknown transport session key for authenticated DCERPC
 - It was the constant "SystemLibraryDTC"
 - All recent versions of Samba and Windows return NT STATUS NO USER SESSION KEY instead
 - DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT is not supported anymore
- samr_Connect5() and Isa_OpenPolicy2() can be used to negotiate a new behaviour
 - It's possible to avoid application level encryption
 - It could rely on DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY
 - I need to continue the discussion with Microsoft about that



- DCERPC BIND TIME SUPPORT PREAUTH
 - The code is ready to be merged in to Samba master
 - Just needs some more tests
- DCERPC BIND TIME PROTECT ALL PDUS
 - The code is ready to be merged in to Samba master
 - Just needs some more tests
- DCERPC BIND TIME SUPPORT WRAP
 - Needs a bit more thinking to get the design robust
 - There's some work in progress prototype
- The LSA and SAMR improvements
 - They need more discussion

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Questions?

$https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DCERPC_Hardening$

- Please contact me if you're a vendor and are interested in implementing this in your product.
- Stefan Metzmacher, metze@samba.org
- http://www.sernet.com
- \rightarrow SerNet sponsor booth

