CVE-2022-2127.html:

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== Subject:     Out-Of-Bounds read in winbind AUTH_CRAP
==
== CVE ID#:     CVE-2022-2127
==
== Versions:    All versions up to 4.18.4, 4.17.9 and 4.16.10.
==
== Summary:     When winbind is used for NTLM
   	            authentication, a maliciously crafted
	            request can trigger an out-of-bounds read
	            in winbind and possibly crash it.
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===========
Description
===========

When doing NTLM authentication, the client sends replies to
cryptographic challenges back to the server. These replies
have variable length. Winbind did not properly bounds-check
the lan manager response length, which despite the lan
manager version no longer being used is still part of the
protocol.

If the system is running Samba's ntlm_auth as authentication backend
for services like Squid (or a very unusual configuration with
FreeRADIUS), the vulnarebility is remotely exploitable

If not so configured, or to exploit this vulnerability locally, the
user must have access to the privileged winbindd UNIX domain
socket (a subdirectory with name 'winbindd_privileged' under "state
directory", as set in the smb.conf).

This access is normally only given so special system services like
Squid or FreeRADIUS, that use this feature.

==================
Patch Availability
==================

Patches addressing both these issues have been posted to:

    https://www.samba.org/samba/security/

Additionally, Samba 4.18.5, 4.17.10 and 4.16.11 have been issued
as security releases to correct the defect.  Samba administrators are
advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon
as possible.

==================
CVSSv3 calculation
==================

A local exploit, for systems without ntlm_auth configured:

CVSS3.1:AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (4.4)

The remote exploit With ntlm_auth configured:

CVSS3.1:AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (5.9)

==========
Workaround
==========

Delegated access to this facility is done via group ownership and
group membership.

The group owner of the 'winbindd_privileged' subfolder under the path
given by
 testparm -s /path/to/smb.conf --parameter-name='state directory'
can be changed to root, or the group members reduced, if the NTLM
authentication feature of tools like Squid and FreeRADIUS is not in
use.

The 0750 permissions must however be retained, as winbindd will
otherwise fail to start.

As reassurance, smbd will continue to use this feature and will
always access this path as root.

=======
Credits
=======

Found through a coverity finding, fixed by the Samba Team.

==========================================================
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
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