============================== Release Notes for Samba 2.2.12 Sept 29, 2004 ============================== ######################## SECURITY RELEASE ######################## Summary: Potential Arbitrary File Access Affected Versions: Samba 2.2.x Summary: A remote attacker may be able to gain access to files which exist outside of the share's defined path. Such files must still be readable by the account used for the connection. CVE ID: CAN-2004-0815 (http://cve.mitre.org/) This is the last stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base. There will be no further Samba 2.2.x releases. ------------- CAN-2004-0815 ------------- A bug in the input validation routines used to convert DOS path names to path names on the Samba host's file system may be exploited to gain access to files outside of the share's path defined by smb.conf. Protecting Unpatched Servers ---------------------------- Samba file shares with 'wide links = no' (a non-default setting) in the service definition in smb.conf are *not* vulnerable to this attack. The Samba Team always encourages users to run the latest stable release as a defense of against attacks. However, under certain circumstances it may not be possible to immediately upgrade important installations. In such cases, administrators should read the "Server Security" documentation found at http://www.samba.org/samba/docs/server_security.html. Credits -------- Both security issues were reported to Samba developers by iDEFENSE (http://www.idefense.com/). Karol Wiesek is credited with this discovery. -- Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow ------------------------------------------------------ ============================== Release Notes for Samba 2.2.11 Aug 12, 2004 ============================== This is the latest stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base. Please note that the Samba 2.2 code tree will reach its End-Of-Life on October 1, 2004. Administrators of existing Samba 2.2 installations are encouraged to upgrade to the latest Samba 3.0.x release prior to that date. The Samba 2.2.11 release addresses the following bug: o Crashes in smbd triggered by a Windows XP SP2 client sending a FindNextPrintChangeNotify() request without previously issuing FindFirstPrintChangeNotify(). Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow ------------------------------------------------------ ============================== Release Notes for Samba 2.2.10 July 22, 2004 ============================== ######################## SECURITY RELEASE ######################## Summary: Potential Buffer Overrun in Samba 2.2.x CVE ID: CAN-2004-0686 (http://cve.mitre.org/) This is the latest stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base. There are no further Samba 2.2.x releases planned at this time. ------------- CAN-2004-0686 ------------- Affected Versions: Samba 2.2.0 through 2.2.9 A buffer overrun has been located in the code used to support the 'mangling method = hash' smb.conf option. Affected Samba 2.2 installations can avoid this possible security bug by using the hash2 mangling method. Server installations requiring the hash mangling method are encouraged to upgrade to Samba v2.2.10 or v3.0.5. The source code can be downloaded from : http://download.samba.org/samba/ftp/ in the file samba-2.2.10.tar.gz. The uncompressed archive has been signed using the Samba Distribution Key. Our code, Our bugs, Our responsibility (Samba Bugzilla). -- The Samba Team Older releases notes for 2.2.x distributions follow ------------------------------------------------------ ============================= Release Notes for Samba 2.2.9 May 8, 2004 ============================= This is the latest stable release of the Samba 2.2 code base. This is a maintenance release of Samba 2.2.8a to address the problem with user password changes after applying the Microsoft hotfix described in KB828741 to Windows NT 4.0/200x/XP clients. No other changes have been applied since Samba 2.2.8a. There are no further Samba 2.2.x releases planned at this time. The source code can be downloaded from : http://download.samba.org/samba/ftp/ in the file samba-2.2.9.tar.gz. The uncompressed archive has been signed using the Samba Distribution Key. As always, all bugs are our responsibility. --Sincerely The Samba Team ------------------------------------------------------ =========================================== What's new in Samba 2.2.8a - 7th April 2003 =========================================== **************************************** * IMPORTANT: Security bugfix for Samba * **************************************** Summary ------- Digital Defense, Inc. has alerted the Samba Team to a serious vulnerability in all stable versions of Samba currently shipping. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the ID CAN-2003-0201 to this defect. This vulnerability, if exploited correctly, leads to an anonymous user gaining root access on a Samba serving system. All versions of Samba up to and including Samba 2.2.8 are vulnerable. An active exploit of the bug has been reported in the wild. Alpha versions of Samba 3.0 and above are *NOT* vulnerable. Credit ------ The Samba Team would like to thank Erik Parker and the team at Digital Defense, Inc. for their efforts spent in the responsible and timely reporting of this bug. Patch Availability ------------------ The Samba 2.2.8a release contains only updates to address this security issue. A roll-up patch for release 2.2.7a and 2.0.10 addressing both CAN-2003-0201 and CAN-2003-0085 can be obtained from http://www.samba.org/samba/ftp/patches/security/. ======================================== The release notes for 2.2.8 follow: **************************************** * IMPORTANT: Security bugfix for Samba * **************************************** Summary ------- The SuSE security audit team, in particular Sebastian Krahmer, has found a flaw in the Samba main smbd code which could allow an external attacker to remotely and anonymously gain Super User (root) privileges on a server running a Samba server. This flaw exists in previous versions of Samba from 2.0.x to 2.2.7a inclusive. This is a serious problem and all sites should either upgrade to Samba 2.2.8 immediately or prohibit access to TCP ports 139 and 445. Advice created by Andrew Tridgell, the leader of the Samba Team, on how to protect an unpatched Samba server is given at the end of this section. The SMB/CIFS protocol implemented by Samba is vulnerable to many attacks, even without specific security holes. The TCP ports 139 and the new port 445 (used by Win2k and the Samba 3.0 alpha code in particular) should never be exposed to untrusted networks. Description ----------- A buffer overrun condition exists in the SMB/CIFS packet fragment re-assembly code in smbd which would allow an attacker to cause smbd to overwrite arbitrary areas of memory in its own process address space. This could allow a skilled attacker to inject binary specific exploit code into smbd. This version of Samba adds explicit overrun and overflow checks on fragment re-assembly of SMB/CIFS packets to ensure that only valid re-assembly is performed by smbd. In addition, the same checks have been added to the re-assembly functions in the client code, making it safe for use in other services. Credit ------ This security flaw was discovered and reported to the Samba Team by Sebastian Krahmerof the SuSE Security Audit Team. The fix was prepared by Jeremy Allison and reviewed by engineers from the Samba Team, SuSE, HP, SGI, Apple, and the Linux vendor engineers on the Linux Vendor security mailing list. The Samba Team would like to thank SuSE and Sebastian Krahmer for their excellent auditing work and for drawing attention to this flaw. Patch Availability ----------------- As this is a security issue, patches for this flaw specific to earlier versions of Samba will be posted on the samba-technical@samba.org mailing list as requested. ************************************ Protecting an unpatched Samba server ************************************ Samba Team, March 2003 This is a note on how to provide your Samba server some protection against the recently discovered remote security hole if you are unable to upgrade to the fixed version immediately. Even if you do upgrade you might like to think about the suggestions in this note to provide you with additional levels of protection. Using host based protection --------------------------- In many installations of Samba the greatest threat comes for outside your immediate network. By default Samba will accept connections from any host, which means that if you run an insecure version of Samba on a host that is directly connected to the Internet you can be especially vulnerable. One of the simplest fixes in this case is to use the 'hosts allow' and 'hosts deny' options in the Samba smb.conf configuration file to only allow access to your server from a specific range of hosts. An example might be: hosts allow = 127.0.0.1 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24 hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0 The above will only allow SMB connections from 'localhost' (your own computer) and from the two private networks 192.168.2 and 192.168.3. All other connections will be refused connections as soon as the client sends its first packet. The refusal will be marked as a 'not listening on called name' error. Using interface protection -------------------------- By default Samba will accept connections on any network interface that it finds on your system. That means if you have a ISDN line or a PPP connection to the Internet then Samba will accept connections on those links. This may not be what you want. You can change this behavior using options like the following: interfaces = eth* lo bind interfaces only = yes that tells Samba to only listen for connections on interfaces with a name starting with 'eth' such as eth0, eth1, plus on the loopback interface called 'lo'. The name you will need to use depends on what OS you are using. In the above I used the common name for ethernet adapters on Linux. If you use the above and someone tries to make a SMB connection to your host over a PPP interface called 'ppp0', they will get a TCP connection refused reply. In that case no Samba code is run at all as the operating system has been told not to pass connections from that interface to any process. Using a firewall ---------------- Many people use a firewall to deny access to services that they don't want exposed outside their network. This can be a very good idea, although I would recommend using it in conjunction with the above methods so that you are protected even if your firewall is not active for some reason. If you are setting up a firewall then you need to know what TCP and UDP ports to allow and block. Samba uses the following: UDP/137 - used by nmbd UDP/138 - used by nmbd TCP/139 - used by smbd TCP/445 - used by smbd The last one is important as many older firewall setups may not be aware of it, given that this port was only added to the protocol in recent years. Using a IPC$ share deny ----------------------- If the above methods are not suitable, then you could also place a more specific deny on the IPC$ share that is used in the recently discovered security hole. This allows you to offer access to other shares while denying access to IPC$ from potentially untrustworthy hosts. To do that you could use: [ipc$] hosts allow = 192.168.115.0/24 127.0.0.1 hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0 this would tell Samba that IPC$ connections are not allowed from anywhere but the two listed places (localhost and a local subnet). Connections to other shares would still be allowed. As the IPC$ share is the only share that is always accessible anonymously this provides some level of protection against attackers that do not know a username/password for your host. If you use this method then clients will be given a 'access denied' reply when they try to access the IPC$ share. That means that those clients will not be able to browse shares, and may also be unable to access some other resources. I don't recommend this method unless you cannot use one of the other methods listed above for some reason. Upgrading Samba --------------- Of course the best solution is to upgrade Samba to a version where the bug has been fixed. If you wish to also use one of the additional measures above then that would certainly be a good idea. Please check regularly on http://www.samba.org/ for updates and important announcements. ****************************************